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Abstract
Short line railroads have been common to the American scene since the
earliest days of the industry. But in recent years there has been renewed
interest because a number of small local enterprises have developed to take
over lines abandoned by major systems. This paper reviews the experience of
ten of these lines, with a primary objective of determining the conditions
affecting viability of such lines, and to give some indication of their
operations and characteristics. Attention is given to their background,
ownership of the track, the previous experience of the persons developing
them, equipment, patterns of operation, employees, traffic patterns, volume
of traffic, and profitability.
In general, it is obvious that some of the lines abandoned by major
systems are viable if operated by local companies. There must, however,
be at least some minimum volume of traffic, a figure not easily defined,
adequate rate divisions, and effective management. Some of the lines in the
sample are clearly succeeding; others are more marginal. Most are suffering
currently from the depressed state of the economy. Some other lines failed
after a year or so, some from inadequate traffic, some from poor management
control, some from inadequate rate divisions.
This paper is preliminary to more intensive analysis of such roads.

THE EXPERIENCE OF LOCAL ENTERPRISES FORMED TO TAKE OYER
RAILWAY LINES ABANDONED BY MAJOR SYSTEMS—
A PRELIMINARY SURVEY*
John F . Due
Professor of Economics, Univ. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
The exclusion of substantial Perm-Central mileage from Conrail, the
liquidation of the Rock Island and the western portion of the Milwaukee,
and proposed extensive abandonment by the Burlington Northern and other
reads have greatly increased interest in action by local groups or other
small enterprises to take over portions of these abandoned routes and operate
^hem as short line railroads. Such activity is by no means new; some
occurred as early as the 1920s, and possibly before. For example, the Casey
and Kansas and the Kansas and Sidell took over portions of a line in east-
central Illinois abandoned by a predecessor of the Baltimore and Ohio and
continued service for a tirne.^
In general the lines abandoned by the major systems until recent years
were sutmarginal and offered little potential for continued operation. The
railroads themselves were slow to seek to abandon service, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) exercised substantial restraining influence on
discontinuance of lines on which there was any significant volume of traffic.
But the recent abandonments offer much greater potential; some are lines with
substantial traffic and even profitable operation by the major roads, but
are left stranded by long line abandonments, such as that of the Milwaukee,
or are lines on which the road does not wish to use its limited capital spending
potential. Furthermore, some of the abandoned lines are in good physical
shape— some being segments of former high speed main lines. The trend has
*The author is greatly indebted to the Caterpillar Tractor Company, whose grant
to the College of Commerce of the University of Illinois financed the travel;
the officials of the various railroads in zhe sample for their assistance; ^o
the officials of Pend Oreille and Madison (ind.) Port Authorities; officials
of the state transportation departments, particularly Wisconsin, Indiana, and
Washington; the Association of American Railroads, Mr. Edward Lewis of the
Lamoille Valley Railroad, and to Mrs. Suzanne Leever for typing the manuscript
and assisting in many other ways.
1. The original line, part of the Cincinnati Hamilton and Dayton, extended
from Olney through Casey and Hume to Sidell.
been furthered by the availability of Federal and state-local funds for
acquisition, rehabilitation, and in some instances temporary operating
subsidies.
The purpose of this paper is to review the experience of a sample of ten
such railroads, with the primary objective of developing criteria for
measuring potential success or failure. Some projects of this type, as
subsequently noted, have failed within a year or so. The aim in the
selection of the sample, subject to constraints of time and funds, was to
get roads with a variety of backgrounds and patterns of ownership and
traffic. While a substantial geographical distribution was sought there
was some deliberate concentration in the midwest.
This work is preliminary to a more detailed analysis planned for the
1
coming year.
1. Substantial detail on short line railroads generally is provided
by the volume entitled Small Railroads
,
published by the Association of
American Railroads (Washington: 1982)
.
The Pend Oreille Valley Railroad
The acar.dor.nent of the Milwaukee lines in the Pacific Northwest has
resulted in the formation of at least three local railroad enterprises. One
is the Pend Oreille Valley, which took over the operation of the Milwaukee's
6l mile line extending northward from Newport through lone to Metaline Falls,
in far northeastern Washington state. The Milwaukee also had trackage rights
over the Burlington Northern (the ex-Great Northern main line) from Spokane
to Newport to connect with its own line through Spokane, hut the Pend Oreille
operates only from Newport. This is a thinly settled wooded, hilly country;
the largest town served, lone, has a population of 575> Metaline Falls, 305
«
The line was "built around the turn of the century; it had for many years
carried a daily passenger train, discontinued in 1936.
Ownership and Lease . The Milwaukee applied to abandon the line on
August h, 1968, as a step in the elimination of its western lines, although
there was no evidence that this line was actually suffering a loss. Neither
the Union Pacific nor the Burlington Northern were interested in the line.
Analysis by the Washington DOT showed a benefit/cost ratio of retaining the
line of 2.5, in part because of the serious adverse effects of abandonment
upon the industries served by the line.
In September of 1978, the voters of the county approved the formation
of the Port District of Pend Oreille to acquire the line; the state of
Washington could not do so for constitutional reasons. Port districts, com-
mon in Washington (about 75) and Oregon (25), have as their primary function-
aiding economic development of the area. This is the only one, however, thus
far to acquire a railroad, although others are considering it. The District
paid $1,385,000, or $22,700 a mile. $1,050,000 was provided by the Economic
Development Administration (EDA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
$350|000 was obtained by the sale of bonds issued by the Port district and
sold to two major shippers, Lehigh Portland Cement and Louisiana Pacific.
The grant Was awarded in September 1979; the railway line was acquired in
March 1980.
The Port leased the line to Kyle Railways for operation. This is a
San Diego based firm that currently operates nine railways. Kyle pays an
annual sum necessary to meet bond obligations (initially interest, then
interest and principal) and then pays a percentage of gross receipts:
8yS when the total of gross receipts is under a half million; 10% between
one half and one million; 3% on the portion in excess of this amount.
Track and Equipment . At the time of transfer, about half of the line
attained Class II Federal track standards, about half, Class I. Rail was
primarily 75 pound, with some 100. About half the ties had deteriorated,
and there was substantial need for reballasting and realignment. The
Washington state rail plan estimated cost of rehabilitation between $1 and
$1.5 million. Following transfer of operations, a '4 year, $3>1 million
rehabilitation program was undertaken. Part of the funds came from the
1. Information on this line was provided by Kyle Railways in San Diego,
by the Pend Oreille Port, and the Washington State Rail Flan , 1978.
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Federal Railway Administration under the ^R and Local Rail Services Assistance
Act; some came from Kyle, and some from the Port. The program is now over
90% complete and both the Port and the railroad report that the line is in
good shape.
The road has two diesels, which it has purchased, and maintains these
in its own shop in Metaline Falls. Primarily Burlington Northern freight
cars are used; Milwaukee owned covered hopper cars assigned to the road are
used for cement, and the road has its own chip cars. The train is now
operating five times a week (in contrast to the Milwaukee's three times in
later years; the latter road operated through from Spokane and could not
make the run in 12 hours, thus requiring two days for the crew) . A two
man crew is used.
Traffic . The total cars originated/terminated for recent years are
as follows: 1976 326l
1977 324-0
1980 3157
1981 35^-5 (approx.; data available through Dec. lo extended
to the end of the year)
Thus, since assumption by the Pend Oreille, the traffic has increased; with
3500 cars, the road is originating/terminating 59 cars per mile. While exact
ton mile figures are not available, the figure would be around 175.000 ton
miles per mile, far higher than that of most light traffic lines. The
traffic is as follows.:
1. Cement, from the Lehigh Portland Cement plant at Metaline Falls.
This firm is by far the largest shipper, and regards the railway as
essential to its continuation in Metaline Falls. It is a major supplier of
cement to the Washington public power system and other large users, including,
currently, the Corps of Army Engineers dam on Willow Creek near Heppner,
Oregon. The plant, which produces very high grade cement, is considering
an expansion that would double its capacity.
2. Wood chips, produced by a subsidiary of Boise Cascade at Usk, the
chips sent normally to Wallula, currently to St. Helens. These chips are
from slash, not a product of lumber production.
3. The Louisiana Pacific lumber mill at lone. Normally a major shipper,
current output (lumber and chips) is limited, and the mill is likely to shut
down again for a period.
4. Coal, the only significant inbound traffic, from Montana, for the
cement plant kilns. There has been some gypsum traffic. During the coming
year substantial traffic is expected from construction of a power plant for
the Seattle power system. There also is the possibility of a new pulp mill,
which would provide substantial inbound and outbound traffic.
The traffic thus far has been relatively immune to trucking, partly
because of the remoteness of the area, but some of the coal is being tracked.
Rates and Earnings . The road has been successful in obtaining joint
rates with the Burlington Northern, the only connection, with a reasonable
division of rates. The management believes that the coal rates are too
high, causing the loss to trucks. The cement plant would like to have lower
rates on cement in order to widen its market areas.
A summary profit and loss statement is shown in table 1. Equipment rental
cost is included in the "equipment" item in operating expenses ($168,000).
Summary . This is one of the most promising of all the new railroad
ventures and is certain to succeed so long as nothing happens to the major
shippers—and this appears unlikely. The volume of traffic would appear to
be adequate; relations with the connecting rail line are good; the track is
owned by the Port and has been rehabilitated. The Port management is very
well satisfied with Kyle performance. Like many small railroads, the fate
does rest tremendously on the future and policies of a very few firms.
Table 1
PEND OREILLE VALLEY RAILROAD
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF INCOME
FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1981 and 1980
OPERATING REVENUE
Freight
Demurrage
Incidental
OPERATING EXPENSES
Way & Structures
Equipment
Transportation
General & Administration
OPERATING INCOME
OTHER INCOME
Interest Income
INCOME BEFORE TAXES
PROVISION FOR TAXES
NET INCOME
Source: Provided by Kyle Railways.
Year to Date
1Q81 1980
$1,067,167
4,180
60.390
1,131,737
$ 954,070
4,900
30,369
989,339
155,392
284,989
247,411
204, 553
892,3^5
253,344
334,200
262,526
157.395
1,007,465
239,392 (18,126)
3.707
3,707
4,620
4,620
243,099 (13,506)
-0- (7.700)
$ 243.099 $ (5,806)
Seattle and Worth Coast Railroad
Background . The Seattle and North Coast has perhaps the most difficult
operating conditions of any railroad in the sample. The line is one of the
very few in the United States not physically connected to any other railroad
track. The line extends 51 miles from Port Angeles to Port Townsend, on the
Olympic Peninsula of Washington. From Port Townsend the freight cars are
ferried across Puget Sound to Pier 27 in Seattle. Port Angeles has a popu-
lation of 17,025, Port Townsend, 5,700, Sequim, 2,725- The line was "built
as the Seattle, Port Angeles and Western in 1915, and acquired by the Milwaukee
in 1918. The Milwaukee ceased service March 1, 1980, and the Seattle and
North Coast took over under contract, beginning operations March 21. The new
company was formed "by three Seattle men, The Vice President and General
Manager, who holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, had some contact with the
railroad industry, having worked for BRAE and as an inspector for Pacific
Car and Foundry. He and his two associates developed the idea of taking over
one of the Milwaukee lines, and ended up with this one; prior to doing so they
operated the North Coast Lines, a locomotive leasing firm.
As of mid-1982, the line is leased from the trustees of the Milwaukee.
Negotiations are under way for purchase of the line, for $4,600,000, which
includes the barges and piers, by two port districts, Port Townsend and
Port Angeles, which will finance by the issuance of revenue bonds. No
Federal funds have been available thus far; the state's position is that the
funds cannot be made available until the line is owned by the port authorities
—
which hopefully will be by Sepbember of 1982
.
The 1978 Washington State Rail Plan analyzed the line, recommending
rebuilding of the transfer bridge at Port Townsend, building a new one at
Port Angeles, and eliminating the rail line between the two cities. The
railroad did not regard this option as feasible, for several reasons. There
appeared to be no good location in Port Angeles, and serious environmental
problems would be encountered. There are major water surges in Puget Sound
in the area that are difficult to overcome. The cost of barging around
Point Wilson, especially in winter, would be high. The railroad would lose
substantial revenue, getting about $300 per car instead of $800. The pos-
sibility of getting other shippers on the line between the two cities would
be eliminated. Thus this option is not considered in the 1982 Plan update,
but stress is placed on the need for modernizing the transfer bridge at
Port Townsend, estimated to cost $819,000, a project that shows a 1^.7
benefit/cost ratio. This project receives high priority in the state rail
plan and is recommended for assistance.
Track . When the S and NC took over, the line was barely operable. The
Milwaukee had placed a load limit of 180,000 pounds, thus preventing the use
of cars most efficient for the traffic. The S and NC did some cleaning of the trans-
fer bridge and raised the weight limit, with special handling. But this is
a temporary expedient, and rebuilding will be necessary. The track was in
eaually bad condition; the combination of the nature of the terrain and the
very high rainfall make track maintenance far more difficult than on most lines.
1. Major sources in addition to the railroad management include Washington
State Rail Plan
. 1978, and 1982 Update (Clympia: Washington State Dept. of
Transportation) , and Theodore Kornweibel, Jr., "Is There Life After Milwaukee?"
Trains
.
Vol. kl (Oct. 198l)
,
pp. 26-30.
Seattle and North Coast Railroad
Source: Washington State Rail Plan Update , 1982.
The line barely met Glass I standards. The rail was 65, 75, 85, and 90
pound, badly worn and much of it too light for heavy cars. Many of the
ties were gone, and in places the rails were down in the mud to the height
of the ties. At least 1,000 new ties per mile and new ballast were urgently
needed. The right of way was overgrown—with the luxurious growth of the
Olympic Peninsula. The 3 and NC raised the track weight limit—but soon had
two major derailments, in one of which several Union Pacific cars loaded with
paper turned over down an embankment.
The new company succeeded in raising funds to begin rehabilitation; in
the last two years, 5 miles of new rail, much of it 115 and 132, some from
the Milwaukee, some from the Santa Fe in Arizona ($170 ton delivered) have
been laid. Five thousand new ties went in in 1981 and 3>000 thus far this
year. One hundred and twenty car loads of ballast, which comes from the UP,
have been installed. All of the track is now clearly to Class I standards,
and much of it to Class II, although additional work is of course required.
The method used is to rebuild half mile sections at a time. The process will
be speeded up later in the year once the line has been purchased. The original
state estimate for funds needed for rehabilitation was $2 million, plus the
funds for the transfer bridge; the current figure is undoubtedly somewhat
greater.
Equipment
. The road has 3 GM F7s, 1500 hp diesels, which came from
the Burlington Northern; they are old but are found to be satisfactory, far
better than the Milwaukee owned SD 9s used at first, whose 6 axles and rigid
frames were found to be hard on the track. The road also has three former
Milwaukee switchers, one kept in Seattle, the others in the two cities served.
The road has acquired some 300 cars under lease from TTEL and BRAE, the
former group coming from the City of Prineville line. The road finds the
lease arrangement satisfactory, although the UP and the BN are not happy of
course, and threatened to cut off the free hire period. Some 30 Longview
Portland and Northern 60 foot cars are used, assigned to Crown Zellerbach.
The line finds that it has about 75% utilization of its leased cars. Under
an unusual arrangement, the line allows free demurrage relief up to 60 days.
The cars are loaded, brought to Seattle, but are not billed, held in the
Seattle yards until the shippers wish them sent on their way. This ensures
quick movement when consignees want the loads quickly, and provides free
storage space. This is in part a recession phenomenon.
The S and NC has a fourth interest in the Whatcom yard in Seattle,
adjacent to the pier, and inherited the Milwaukee's full responsibility for
maintenance.
Service is provided five times a week, compared to the Milwaukee's
three times a week frequency in later years.
The Barge Operation . The road owns two barges, with 12 car capacity
(50 foot cars) . The tugs are not operated by the company, which contracts
with Foss, but the railroad does provide personnel (two) for the barges.
The crossing takes from 5 to 9 hours for the 45 miles. The dock also handles
Union Pacific car barge movements from Sheldon and Port Gamble. The line
has been interested in acquiring the Western Pacific car ferry Las Plumas.
The railroad faces a major problem because the city of Seattle is seeking to
take over Pier 27 for a container dock.
Traffic . There are ten shippers on the line. Three are paper products
producers, the other lumber and lumber products. Crown Zellerbach and ITT
Rayonier are the major shippers. Most of the shippers, including the two
large ones, are located in Port Angeles. The chief single item consists
of a wide range of paper items. Wood pulp has been increasing in volume,
shipped in containers, for export. There is some lumber traffic, but it
is only about 10f2 of the total. Plywood is a significant item. Much of the
lumber moves on flat cars, the plywood in 40 and 50 foot boxcars. There is
no remanufacture on the peninsula. There is a limited amount of transit
traffic in veneer for finishing on the mainland. Inbound traffic largely
consists of chemicals and other ingredients for the mills and some miscellaneous
items such as farm equipment. There is no wood chip traffic, which all moves
10
"by barge. The chip traffic nay develop if imports of chips from Canada
cease. While much of the traffic is not considered vulnerable to trucking,
there has been some increase in truck use. In the past, trucks were
reluctant to go to the peninsula, as there was no back haul; more are now
willing to do so. They handle a considerable portion of the small-lot
lumber shipments.
Total traffic in recent years has been as follows:
Year Cars Cars Total
originated terminated
1976 4069 1104 5173
1977 3761 892 4653
1978 2466 725 3185
1981 2349 154 2503
1982 est 3600
The decline reflected in part the deterioration in service and provision of
poor cars in the last years of the Milwaukee, a severe car shortage,
and the severe depression in the lumber industry. The road predicts a
sharp increase in lumber traffic as recovery comes.
One estimate of the potential total traffic in 1978 was 6400 cars, with
good rail service and adequate car supply. About 90% of the traffic is
originating.
At the figure of 36OO cars, the line is originating/terminating about
71 cars per mile of line or about 140,000 ton miles per mile. These are
good figures on the basis of experience elsewhere, and they should be
adequate, and from every indication the traffic should increase. With the
6400 car estimate, the originated/terminated figure would be 125.
Rates . The S and NC first tried to operate with Milwaukee joint rates
but this was impossible as there was no Seattle gateway. The line negotiated
with the UP and EN, and came up with divisions regarded as adequate; the
road receives typically a 15% share of the western carrier portion of the
joint rates and as high as 22% on some. The road has frequently teen able
to get one of the roads to make a concession and then the other follows.
Ninety percent or more of all traffic moves on joint rates; an exception is
the use of combination rates on the movement of coal from Salina on the
Denver and Rio Grande. Outbound rates are somewhat higher than from Seattle,
but they always have been, reflecting the advantage the mills have of being
close to their materials supply. About 60 percent of the interchange is with
the EN, 40 percent with the UP.
Employees . There is a total of 53 employees, unusually large for a
51 mile line, but necessitated by the switching problems and the barge
operation. There are three switching crews (one in Seattle, one each in the
two cities served) and a 3 man train crew. A caboose is used and is regarded
as essential. Train crews do other work as needed. The round trip run
requires 8 to 10 hours; the line hopes to reduce this to 8. It was 16 when
11
the S and NG began. There are 6 men on the section crew. All but five of
the operating employees are from the Milwaukee, and the superintendent had
10 years with that road.
All employees are paid on a salary basis, but with the requirement that
they do a variety of tasks as required
—
particularly the switching crews,
who do some of the track maintenance work. Operations are nonunion (though
the operating personnel were union members on the Milwaukee) . The unions
brought legal action to require hiring of all ex-Milwaukee personnel used
on the line, on the grounds that the socalled Miami agreement applied. The
railroad won the fight ; the unions then sought to organize the workers but
did not succeed. The flexibility in the use of labor is essential for small
railroads to operate, and this the S and NC has maintained.
Earnings. It is not possible to get a meaningful figure of earnings
in recent years because of the rehabilitation work. The Milwaukee in pro-
posing abandonment indicated that the line made a contribution to overhead
and profit, but not enough to warrant rehabilitation (which the MILW lacked
funds to do anyway). The road reported a 1980-81 loss of about $1.2 million
because of rehabilitation expenditures, and expects a figure of $250,000
for the current year. But operations, because of the depressed economy, are
only about kO percent of normal, and the management expects a profit within
a year or so—with some economic recovery. The operating cost is about
$4.5 million a year; the revenue estimate for 1983 is $7 million. The high
revenue is of course a product of the high rate commodities handled and the
reasonable rate divisions.
Conclusion . The general impression is that despite all of its problems,
including some reportedly bad relations with shippers initially, the S & NC
should succeed, so long as traffic increases back to levels of pre-recession
years. The heavy losses indicated by the shippers if the line is abandoned
suggest their willingness to support it.
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South Central Tennessee Railroad ( Kyle Railways )
Background. The South Central Tennessee extends 51 miles from Colesburg,
on the Nashville-Memphis line of the Louisville and Nashville (L&N) (formerly
the Nashville Chattanooga and St. Louis main line) southward to Centerville
and Hohenwald, in a heavily wooded, hilly area southwest of Nashville. The
line was built "by the N C and St. L. in the l§90s, and once extended an
additional 10 miles to Aliens Creek. The two counties for which the line is
the only rail service, Hickman and Lewis, have about 20,000 population;
Centerville has 2,824, Hohenwald, 3.922. There are a few other villages.
The line is a difficult one to operate; in 24 instances the grade exceeds
3%, and there are Ik curves in excess of 15°
The L&N first sought to abandon the line—known as its Centerville
branch— in 1973- This was approved by the I.C.C. in 1976, but appeals and
then an agreement with the Tennessee Department of Transportation, which
sought to retain the line, delayed abandonment until 1978, although actually
L&N service in later years was minimal. As of July 1, 1978, the South
Central Tennessee bought the line and contracted with Kyle Railways of
San Diego to operate it, under a lease purchase agreement extending to 1999*
Federal and state funds were obtained for rehabilitation, which has been
completed, with some new rail (most was 80 to 102, but some was 62 and 68,
which was replaced), ties (atleast half were useless), and ballast.
Traffic . There are two principal industries served. The major one is
a hardwood chip plant at Centerville. This plant grinds up hardwood trees
to produce chips; the chips are not a byproduct of lumber production. The
other major shipper is a firm in Hohenwald that produces synthetic rubber
products, such as firehoses, and employs, in good times, 570 persons.
There are also a few small hardwood lumber mills, including a tie manufacturing
plant
.
The most important traffic, volume-wise, is hardboard chips moving to
a hardboard plant in Kentucky. The chips move entirely by rail. There is
also a limited amount of outbound lumber. Inbound traffic consists of
carbon, silica, and limestone, for the factory in Hohenwald (which does not
normally ship out by rail). The L&N, the road's only rail connection,
provides joint rates and a rate division regarded as equitable.
The volume of traffic in the mid-seventies and currently has been as
follows:
Year Carloads
1973 1.308
1975 9^
1975 5^
1981 1,836
The first five months of 1982 show an increase of 21% over 1981. The traffic
volume is relatively light compared to other roads in the sample, amounting
to 36 cars originated/terminated per mile, or roughly about 88,000 net ton
miles per mile of line, but has increased sharply.
T~. Primary sources were Kyle Railways and the Tennessee State Rail
Plan , 1978.
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South Central Tennessee Railroad
Source: Modified from Tennessee State Rail Plan, 1978.
Service and Employees . Service is provided five times a week between
Coiesburg and the chip mill near Centerville, ^0 miles. Twice a week an
extra crew goes on to Hohenwald. The L & N operated twice a week (in later
years) through to Hohenwald, and encountered substantial overtime. The
train is operated with a crew of two. There are only 15 employees (including
some assistance from Kyle headquarters in San Diego), the General Manager,
and an assistant general manager, one office person, an assistant super-
intendant, the crew of two, and 8 on track and equipment maintenance. Most
of the workers can do other tasks as well. Operation is nonunion. The
shop is located at Watsons Siding, south of Centerville.
14
Equipment . The line has four diesels', two are RS-lls, one of which was
bought from the L & N, one from the Southern Pacific ("built 1959); these are
used in tandem on x.he run to Cencerville. An FM H10-44 is normally used
on the run to Kohenwald. The trains average only about 5 cars. The railroad
leases chip cars from 3SAE; these are returned empty by the L & N after
completing the run to Kentucky. The L and N cannot supply cars of this type
and thus has no objection to the leasing.
Summary . As noted above, traffic has been rising, despite unfavorable
economic climate, and operations are profitable. But this is certainly a
marginal operation, given the traffic volume and the difficult operating
conditions. But it appears to be succeeding.
15
Gettysburg rtailroad
Background . The Gettysburg Railroad extends from Holly Springs, Pen-
nsylvania, where it connects with Gonrail, southward 23.^ miles to Gettysburg
and a connection with the Chessie System . The Holly Springs connection is
with Gonrail' s line to Hagerstown and its junction with the Norfolk and
Western; the Chessie connection is with the former Western Maryland line
between Baltimore and Hagerstown via Hanover. The principal intermediate
towns are Biglerville, the major source of traffic, and Gardners, with popu-
lations of 991 and 160 respectively. This was a portion of the Reading's
Harrisburg-Gettysburg line, a major route for handling of through traffic
between the Western Maryland and the Reading (which were affiliated roads
under the Baltimore and Ohio)
,
particularly coal traffic originating on the
WM. The line was also once a major passenger route.
The Reading stopped service in May of 1976 as its operations ended; Conrail
provided irregular service for a few months; and in October of 1976 the
Gettysburg Railroad took over the lines. The USRA Preliminary Plan did not
propose inclusion in Conrail , but suggested further study; the final plan
recommended sale to Ghessie. It was evident from the analyses made by USRA
and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation that the line served a
significant purpose and was not far from breaking even. But the Chessie did
not acquire it, and thus it became available for a designated operator.
The Gettysburg was a project of three members of the Cornell family, who
had operated a tourist line in western Pennsylvania. In May of 1976 they
learned that the Gettysburg line would not be included in Conrail, and that
the state sought an operator. The Cornells met with the shippers, applied
to the state to be the designated operator, and received authorization.
From 1976 to December 1981, the state leased the line from the trustees
of the Reading, and the railroad leased from the state. In December the
state bought the line from the trustees; after the original offer was
turned down, the state filed a condemnation suit, and received the line
for a tentative figure regarded as reasonable, $1,512,612. The funds
came partly from the Federal government, partly the state, and partly the
owners, acting for the shippers. The railway is obligated to pay the
state when the earnings are adequate to do so, as they have been in several
years.
Track and Equipment . The line is laid with 130 pound rail because it
was once a main line, a weight unusual for li^ht traffic lines. Some was
worn on curves and required replacing. A number of ties have been replaced.
Over the whole, the track is in good shape for the traffic.
T. Primary sources were officials of the railroad, Pennsylvania
State Rail Plans 1 ar*^ Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
2. In 1973, according to the USRA Final System Plan , the line originated
or terminated 1590 cars, or 67-9 cars per mile (lC per train). The stations
and carloads were Peach Glen (86), Gardners (208), Bindersville (266), Bigler-
ville (959), Gettysburg (7l). There were 18 shippers, Inland Container pro-
viding about half the traffic. Duffy-Mott and Musselman were the other major
shippers. USRA, Final System Plan (Washington: 1975) PP- 912-13-
Gettysburg Railroad
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation Map of Pennsylvania
, 1976
The line owns 12 insulated boxcars with moveable bulkheads purchased from
the Reading, to meet the needs of the fruit shippers; the firms often ship in
8 car groups, and the two major roads could not supply the cars, resulting
in the loss of traffic to trucks. The firm has avoided the car leasing deals.
There are four diesels. One 1000 hp Baldwin came from the firm's operations
in western Pennsylvania; four ALCO 1600 diesels were purchased from the Long
Island. One has been sold and one cannabilized; two are still in service.
The fourth is a 2000 hp ALG0 purchased from the N & W. There is no' piggyback
operation. Chessie is unwilling to give joint rates as currently the trailers
(usually handling food products) are trucked to points on the Chessie lines.
Trains were operated six or seven times a week, compared with three by
the Reading; the service has been cut to 5 because Gonrail has eliminated
its Saturday and Sunday trains. The trains operate in the daytime, leaving
Gettysburg in the morning, servicing the industries, going on to the Holly
Springs interchange, and returning in the afternoon. Sometimes cars brought
to the container plant are dropped off in the morning and are ready empty for
pickup on the return trip. Usually only one diesel is required on the trains.
A typical train has nine or ten cars.
The trains operate with a crew of two, without a caboose. There are 11
employees, total, including the three members of the Cornell family who
provide the management and office staff; a crew of 2, k for equipment and
track maintenance, and one general work. The line is nonunion. The road
does its own diesel maintenance, calling in a retired Chessie repairman on
occasion for more difficult jobs. The line is able to clear its derailments,
which are not common. There have been only two significant ones since the
Gettysburg company took over, and they did little harm. The derailments were
apparently a product of "running up" of cars rather than track defects.
The railroad also runs regular passenger excursion service on weekends
during the summer, and several major special excursions, which handle as many
as 500 passengers. The road has several old steam locomotives, and a half
dozen coaches for this purpose. This is, however, incidental to the freight
business.
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The traffic pattern is much more varied than that of most small railroads,
the hulk of the traffic to or from points on the line "being inbound. The
largest inbound shipper is a container plant that brings in pulpboard by
rail and ships out some containers by rail. There are three fruit (primarily
apple) canners on the line, which bring in materials, such as sugar and corn
syrup, by rail, and ship some of their canned produce by rail. There is one
fertilizer plant pins feed stores and lumber yards that bring in some of their
supplies by rail. By far the most important source of the traffic is Bigler-
ville, 8 miles from Gettysburg; relatively little originates or terminates
in Gettysburg itself. The major interchange is with the Ghessie, a smaller
portion with Conrail. The road has joint rates with both of the two con-
necting lines; the management has found Chessie to be highly cooperative
with rates and handling of traffic, Conrail less so.
Distinct from the traffic to and from the lines is the very substantial
amount of bridge traffic between Conrail and Chessie: as noted below, this
greatly exceeds the points-on-line traffic. A portion of this is dimensional
traffic—shipments too large to pass through a tunnel on Chessie and too wide
for the clearances on Conrail in Baltimore. This was also important prior
to the formation of Conrail. But there is substantial other bridge traffic
as well— sugar, scrap metal, paper, etc. This proves to be a more satisfac-
tory connection between the two roads than other more congested junctions.
Figures of carloads handled are for selected years are as follows:
Year Carloads to and
from the line
Bridge Traffic Combined
1973 1872 12,000
197*+ 2028 12,000 ave "
1976 -- — 6556
1981 1757 M50 6907
Thus the carloads originated/terminated per mile in 1981 was 76, similar
to the figure in 1973; the bridge traffic constituted 180 cars per mile,
to bring the total to 256. This is obviously a figure adequate to allow the
covering of costs. The bridge traffic is much less than it was a decade ago,
largely because of the reorganized structure of the major railroads. Without
the bridge traffic the survival of the road would be marginal. The combined
traffic is about 300,000 ton net miles per mile of line.
Except for funds for purchase of the line, the road is not subsidized
and is operating profitably, sifficient in most years to meet the require-
ments for repayment of a portion of the purchase assistance. The earnings
picture has been as follows:
Period
Vl/77 - 3/31/78
Vl/78 - 3/31/79
Vl/79 - 3/31/20
4/l/80 - 3/31/81
Attributable
Revenues
$ 635,206
820,872
325,696
763,970
Avoidable
Costs
$ 5^3,553
768,994
804,328
702,542
Excess
Revenues
$ 91,653
51,878
21,368
61,428
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In the leasing period, the "excess revenues" were paid to the state toward
the leasing cost. Now that the state owns the line, the excess revenues are
paid into an interest hearing account that the railroad can use only with the
state's permission—for example, to repair washouts or make improvements.
The Gettysburg provides a good example of a line that is succeeding
under local operation that was not profitable as a part of a major system.
While reorganization of the eastern railroads cost it a substantial portion
of its bridge traffic, its on line traffic has been increasing. The bridge
traffic, however, is important to the financial success of the line.
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Prairie Central
The Prairie Central Railroad extends from Decatur, Illinois, eastward
to Paris, 75 miles in length (the first 11 mile section out of Decatur is
on trackage rights over the Illinois Central Gulf). This company, owned "by
Trans-Action Associates of New Lenox, Illinois (the Burroughs system) began
operating the line June 26, 1981, replacing the Wabash Valley Railroad,
owned by Morrison Knudson of Boise, Idaho, which ceased on March 1, 1981.
Background . This line was built in the rail building boom after the
Civil War, as part of the Vandalia Railroad. This firm was absorbed by the
Pennsylvania, its main line becoming the Pennsylvania's Indianapolis- St. Louis
line, this portion the Pennsylvania's Terre Haute-Peoria line, a roundabout way of
reaching Peoria from the east. The track deteriorated badly in the last days of the
Penn Central and was not recommended by USRA for inclusion in Conrail . The
Decatur traffic was eliminated in the evaluation; with this approach the
1973 traffic was only 108? cars, or 15 per mile originated/terminated. The
Illinois Department of Transportation, however, in the 1975 Rail Plan , gave
the line top category priority for preservation, on the grounds that it was
profitable if the Decatur traffic was included, and no subsidy, except for
rehabilitation, would be required. Conrail operated the line under subsidy
from April 1, 1976 to January 1, 1977, when the state designated the newly
formed Wabash Valley Railroad as the operator and provided subsidy to it.
Between 1977 and 1980 a total of $1.5 million was provided under subsidy,
much of it for rehabilitation. But as shown below, an operating subsidy was
required, despite track improvements, and more adequate car supply. With the
expiration of the availability of Federal funds for the subsidy, the state
terminated funds as of March 1, 1981, and WV ceased operations. As noted,
Prairie Central offered to operate it without subsidy, and was so designated,
commencing June 26, 1981.
The losses incurred under Wabash Valley operation are as follows:
Year Revenues Expenses Operating Accelerated
Subsidy Maintenance
(millions of $s)
1977 4.8 4.8 neg. .5
1978 2.3 3-6 1.3 -7
1979 1-6 2.9 1.3 -4
Source: Illinois State Rail Plan , 1979
Line, Track, and Equipment . The line provides service to 15 shipping
points, by far the largest being Decatur (population 94,08l). Lovington (1,313)
is the other largest shipping point (and has no other railroad); others,
with population, if any, in parentheses, are as follow: Prairie Hall,
Lake City (lOO), Arthur, also on the Missouri Pacific, (2,122), Kemp (50),
Hindsboro (407), and Oakland (l,035). These are primarily grain shipping
points. There are only nominal grades and very little curvature of track.
The line connects with Chessie, Norfolk and Western and ICG at Decatur,
1. Source: the railroad management and various Illinois State Rail Flans .
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Prairie Central
Source: U.S. Railway Association, Final System Plan (Washington: 1975),
Vol. 2, p. 70, modified to eliminate the abandoned Lovington line. There is
no connection with the ICG main line at Areola. C & EI is now Missouri Pacific.
the Missouri Pacific at Arthur, a secondary line of the N & W at Oakland (the
connection not now used) and Conrail at Paris. The track is now in good
condition, meeting class II standards, and operations are typically at 20
miles per hour. A substantial amount of subsidy money was used for rehabili-
tation of the line, including rebuilding a bridge at Oakland. The Conrail
weight limit of 220,000 pounds, which prevented the use of loaded hopper
cars, has been raised to 263,000 tons. The deferred maintenance has been
eliminated, and only routine maintenance will be required in the future.
The line has 5 diesels, 3 UP 25s (General Electric), 1200 hp, purchased
from Perm Central trustees, and 2 GP9s, 1500 hp., leased from Penn Central
with an option to buy. The firm maintains these itself. The railroad leases
120 hopper cars from Thrall to ensure a better car supply, and has six
Louisiana Midland boxcars assigned to it
.
Operations are somewhat complex. Typically service is being provided
six times a week, trains averaging about 30 cars. The night crew begins
work at Decatur at 10 pm, does the switching of the cars provided by the
connecting lines, and heads for Paris, picking up loaded cars and dropping
empties along the way. The crew performs the switching at Paris and starts
back; when it reaches normally 10 hours, and never more than 12, as required
by law, it is relieved by the day crew, sent out by car. The day crew brings
the train back and does the switching in Decatur. The two crews alternate
by the week. The crew consists of two men.
All personnel are paid on a salary basis, with overtime where necessary.
Employees are not unionized; wages are essentially those based on local
standards, with good fringe benefits. There are 24 employees for the Paris-
Decatur line:
Crew members, h, plus 2 trainees
Track, h
Equipment maintenance, 2
Administrative and office, 8 (President and Vice President (shared
with other Trans-Action roads), General Manager, Superintendent
,
Agent, Director of Marketing, agency clerk, auditor, assistant
auditor.
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The traffic is primarily grain and grain products, roughly 99 percent.
Ninety percent of the traffic originates in Decatur, from the ADM and Staley
mills. The road does not have direct access to the plants, picking up the
cars after switching "by the other roads. Primarily the traffic is outbound,
hut some does come in, as for example, paper for a plant in Arthur. There
is a limited amount of "bridge traffic; "basically the road is not well located
to serve as a bridge route. Most of traffic goes to the northeast, hut there
is some grain traffic to Arkansas, for example.
The road has joint rates with its connecting lines; it simply took over
the tariffs and rate divisions of the Wabash Valley. By far the most important
interchange is with Conrail, which the road reports to be highly cooperative.
This is the only direct route that Conrail has to tap the important Decatur
traffic.
For the eastbound grain and grain products traffic, the principal
competitor is the Norfolk and Western; the Baltimore and Ohio, which parallels
the road from Decatur eastward seven miles or so to the north, is not
aggressive in seeking traffic. The Prairie Central-Gonrail combination can
save, according to an ADM check, 5 days each way on the cars over the N & Wj
this is the main basis for capturing traffic.
No figure of total carloadings for the line for the first full year of
Prairie Central operations is available, but at present levels should
exceed 7,000. The 1976-77 fiscal year was 5,533; 1978, 53^7; 1979, 658^.
With estimated current traffic, the net ton miles per mile of line would be
about 400,000; cars originated/terminated per mile about 90. This is clearly
within the range of possible profitable operation—but not with any surplus.
The company reports successful and profitable operation. The interesting
question is: why did the Wabash Valley not succeed? There are several
possible answers. For a time a serious car shortage reduced traffic. Wages
and salaries paid were much higher than those of the Prairie Central—though
it too was nonunion. Morrison-Knudscn apparently lost all interest in the
line, and made the decision to quit once the subsidy was coming to an end;
the line had not been successful in attaining the subsidy-free status which
the various state rail plans regarded as possible. The Prairie Central
appears to be operating much more successfully.
As of June 1982 the Prairie Central has taken over operation of the
former New York Central line extending from Paris to Lawrenceville, which
was abandoned by Conrail. Three track workers have been added for this
line, which is still being operated on an intermittent basis, by supervisory
personnel. The plans call for additional personnel and regularly scheduled
operation.
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Indiana Hi-Raii Corporation
The Indiana Hi-Rail is the first line, in Indiana to "be formed under
the feeder line provisions of the Staggers Act; the line was originally
included in Conrail, which in 1980 indicated plans to abandon it; the Hi-Rail
firm was organized and successfully hid for the line, winning out over the
owners of the Indiana and Ohio, reviewed in the next section.
Background
. The line extends 6.1 miles southward from a junction with
the N & W's Connersville "branch at Beesons (merely a junction) to Connersville
(population, 17,023). It parallels the N & W's own line to Connersville, "but
has far "better access to shippers. The line crosses under, and currently
does not connect with, Chessie (B & 0) in Connersville, and at its southern
end connects with the Whitewater Valley, a passenger-only carrier operating
excursion trains to Metamora. This is a portion of the former New York
Central (Big k) line from Cincinnati to Cambridge and Hagerstown, Ind.,
a semi-main line, known as the White Water Division. The Indiana and Ohio
also operates on a portion of this line close to Cincinnati. There is no
longer a connection between the southern end of the Whitewater Valley and the
I and at Brookville.
The Beesons-Connersville Line was recommended in the USRA final system
plan for sale to the N & W, to be included in Conrail if the N & W did not
buy it. As the N & W was not interested, the line became a part of Conrail.
But with the abandonment of the former Pennsylvania main line across Indiana
this segment was left disconnected from the remainder of the Conrail system
by a 45 mile gap, covered by trackage rights over the N & W. Thus in the
19S0-81 restructuring of Conrail the decision was made to abandon it, despite
the relatively high traffic volume.
The Indiana Hi Rail Corporation was formed by R. Powell Felix and David
Smoot; the members of the Felix family own a majority of the stock in the
Chap. S corporation. Both Felix and Smoot had worked for the Indiana Public
Service Commission, Smoot having written the first three Indiana rail plans.
Felix, who was originally a school teacher, had contact with other small
railroads in the state on a consulting basis. The new company bought the
line from Conrail for $100,000 (or $16,667 a mile), a price regarded as a
very good one—and a figure that is in tremendous contrast with those
Penn Central is asking for their lines. Operations by the new company
began Dec. 11, 1981.
Track and Equipment . Most of the track was below class I standards;
Conrail, which had avoided capital improvements on the line, estimated that
$60,000 would be required before Spring of 1982. The most urgent work
was done; 225 ties and 200 tons of "ballast were installed. An estimated
5500 ties, about 900 per mile, will be required. Application has been made
for $379,000 in Federal funds for rehabilitation; the firm believes that
this will be forthcoming. Rail is 80, 90, and 105 pound, and is in good
shape; it does not require replacing.
1. Source: The company; Indiana 1980 State Rail Plan.
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The road has one ALGO diesel, £4, 1000 hp., built in 1953 for the
Santa Fe. It had been used on the Michigan Northern and the Carthage (ind.)
line. The company finds it to be in good shape, and parts are available,
made by Bombardier. Such a diesel has a $55,000 list price, but the company
paid less than this. The line also has access in an emergency to the
Whitewater Valley RR ' s Lima Hamilton 750 hp. switcher. The road has a
number of leased cars, 20 gondolas, 71 box cars, from Rail Gar Parker in
Atlanta and from BRAE, some of the latter still labeled Union Railroad of
Oregon and Oregon and Northwestern. The line also has 9 covered hoppers.
Of the leased cars, 63 are currently in service off line; they are leased
for the road's own use on originating shipments, not for leasing earnings,
per se. The line also has Jl assigned cars from BRAE for dishwasher service,
and 8^ high cube cars assigned for the automobile parts service. These are
loaded with car parts and return empty to Connersville. Some are N & W,
some Conrail, and one Rio Grande car.
Employees . There are 9 full time employees—a train crew of 3»
President, Vice President, superintendent of track, superintendant of
equipment, two in the office, and 3 crew members plus 7 part time track
crew. All employees are from Conrail (New York Central portion). The
crew are members of United Transportation Union, with which the road has a
2h
contract, "but one very different from those applying to the major roads.
Pay is 80 percent of the standard wage schedule; there are no work rules,
and the train can operate with a crew of 2. Three are used as a matter
of necessity, given the extensive switching. Overtime is paid only after
10 hours. Management is convinced that as a small road grows, unionization
is inevitable and it might as well "be started early.
Operation
.
The train operates five times a week, Tuesday through
Saturday (this "best serves the shippers). The crew "begins at 3:30 am,
does the switching, goes -co the junction and "back and distributes the cars,
finishing in the early afternoon. Currently, trains average 7 to 8 cars a
day, "but operations of the shippers are at very low levels, and the figure
is certain to increase with recovery.
There are three major shippers, all in Connersville. One of the two
largest, a Ford plant. (technically Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp.)
produces car parts; in 1979 it shipped 152^ cars. The second is Design
and Manufacture, which, it is estimated, produces about half of all the
dishwashers in the United States for a variety of brand name sellers. The
third, Cohen Bros., is a major shipper of scrap metal. Outbound traffic
constitutes 95 percent of the total, including logs and grain as well as
the major categories. There is some inbound traffic in steel. The firm is
engaged in a rate dispute with the N & W, and believes that with appropriate
rate adjustments it can get most or all of the steel traffic. The shippers
accept the line as permanent, and are planning major expansions. The scrap
metal firm just installed a new large press.
The line interchanges only with the N and W at Beesons, and via the
N and W to the B and 0; there is no connection with Conrail. The line plans
to install a direct interchange with the Chessie system in Connersville.
There are no joint rates; the company is regarded as a switching carrier
only, and receives a flat amount per car from the major carrier—currently
$185, to go to $26^. This is paid by the line haul carrier. The road
regards this as good compensation. There is no interline billing; only
a simple waybill is prepared. The Indiana Hi Rail also applies a surcharge,
$30 on auto parts, $20 on scrap, none on dishwashers, which move at relatively
high rates. The shippers do not object.
The current volume of traffic is somewhat over 2,000 cars a year, or
333 cars per mile, but with a normal economy the figure should reach JQOQr
,
cars, or 500 per mile. At the present volume, the revenue ton miles per
mile per year is about 120,000.
The firm took over the line on a nonsubsidized basis, and is earning a
profit even at present traffic levels. Given the strong potential traffic
volume there should be no question about the ability of the company to
survive. Operation was not unprofitable under Conrail; its problems centered
around the isolation of the line from the system and the need for substantial
capital for rehabilitation.
The company has recently taken over operation of a coal carrying line
in eastern Ohio, under the name of Ohi-Rail, from Minerva to Hopedale,
39 miles, abandoned by Conrail early in 1982.
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In Eastern Indiana, the company is seeking three additional lines:
1. The Newcastle-Rushville line of the N and W, which the latter company is
seeking to abandon; Hi-Rail has offered $113,000 for 23 miles. This line
has substantial potential for grain unit trains. The company also is interested
in the N and W's Newcastle-Connersville line as far as Beesons, which would
give it direct access to the main line at Newcastle. The N and W had this
up for abandonment and then withdrew the petition, perhaps as a "bargaining
device. These two N and W "branches are portions of the old Lake Erie and
Western, later part of the Nickel Plate. Finally, the company would like to
acquire the Cambridge City-Richmond line abandoned by Conrail, a portion of
the old Pennsylvania main line. One track remains in place, but is not now
operated (except the eastern 6 miles, on N and W track). The rail is 140
pound weight, in excellent shape. Thus the present 6 miles may become the
nucleus for a substantial system.
The criteria of the Hi-Rail owners in selection of possible lines are
as follows:
1. Adequate traffic density—over 70 to 80 cars per mile. Usually if
the figure exceeds 100, major carriers want them. The Connersville line is
an exception.
2. Connection with more than two major carriers.
3. More than one dominant customer.
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The Indiana and Ohio Railroad
The Indiana and Ohio Railroad, with offices in Brookville, Indiana,
extends 26 miles southeastward from Brookville to Valley Jet., near Cin-
cinnati. The line was excluded from Conrail, cut given sufficient priority
(#3) "by "the Indiana Rail Plan to "be eligible for subsidy, which it received
through June 30> 1982. This is a segment of the Big Four, later Perm
Central, line that extended from Cincinnati through Connersville to Cambridge
City and originally to Hagerstown. Subsidy was initially provided by
Indiana and by shippers for continued operation by Conrail, which did so on
a limited basis from 1976 to 1979- Then - it was embargoed north of Cedar
Grove, and finally north of the Indiana border.
Background
. The principal shipping point on the line is Brookville,
population 287^. Others are Cedar Grove and Harrison (populations 217 and
5855 respectively) . This is very hilly, wooded area, with mixed farming
and some industrial activity. It is a highly scenic area, particularly along
the Whitewater.
The Indiana and Ohio was formed by four local families, headed by
H. E. Weller, a third generation railroader, who had worked for the Chessie
system. He had long been interested in the road and when the opportunity
arose, took the initiative. The company was formed, owned by the four
families, and would have been ready to take over the line as early as 1976,
but was not willing to do so until the rehabilitation was completed. Mean-
while, Conrail operated sporadically, on the portion not embargoed. The
I and took over June 21, 1979, but could not operate to Brookville until
the bridge at Cedar Grove was rebuilt, Feb. 28, 1980.
The I and leases the line from the Perm Central and has been endeavoring
to buy it. The Penn Central has pushed the rent up sharply, from $76,000 to
$17^,000 a year, and is demanding $2.3 million for the line, or $88,000 a
mile- -a figure in no way related to the salvage value or the earning capacity.
The I and has taken the issue to court in litigation and is currently
operating under court order. The Penn Central reportedly resists a condem-
nation suit on the grounds that it is a railroad, but resists intervention
by the I.C.C. on the grounds that it is not a railroad—or so it appears.
Hopefully the courts or the commission will establish a reasonable value.
A figure between $300,000 and $500,000 is regarded by the railroad as a fair
figure
.
Equipment and Track . The I and has one functioning engine, a Baldwin
DS 44, 1000 hp., which does all of the work. It was built in 1948 for the
Western Railway of Alabama, worked on the Seaboard and other roads, and is
leased by the I and from an equipment dealer. The manager regards the
Baldwin as very satisfactory, a 4 cycle engine easy to repair. Equipment
is maintained by the road; for major work one of the customer firms would
provide assistance. The I and has also a Lima Hamilton 20, but it is not
operable for freight service at present. It could be run in multiple with
the Baldwin. The company has some freight cars "deployed" on the line by
Rail Car Parker of Atlanta
—35 box cars and 2 flat cars. About 20 are in
service, 14 in storage. The line has these under the usual arrangement,
whereby it receives a portion of per diem while the cars are in use but does
not pay otherwise—unless payment for storage is necessary.
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Indiana and Ohio Railroad
Source: Modified from Transportation Map of Indiana , U.S. Department of
Transportation 1976.
The rail is about ^5% 80 pound, hjf, 90, the rest 60 and 70. Most of
the original 60 pound rail was replaced in 1918 and 1919. The rail, much of
which was rolled in 191^-15> is in had shape. Currently, the train can
operate— cautiously—the track meeting Class I standards, following sub-
stantial rehabilitation, although more is required. A $755,529 track
rehabilitation program was completed in September 1977 and a bridge at
Cedar Grove rebuilt for $102,27^. There have been two derailments in the
last three years. One was due to a broken rail, one to soft earth. The
plan is to get the line on a ^0 year replacement cycle.
Operation and Personnel . The train operates with a two man crew, the
president often assisting in the switching. The train operates two or three
times a week, taking 7§- to 8 hours; the actual running time is about 5 hours.
It operates on alternate business days, thus Monday, Wednesday, Friday one
week, Tuesday, Thursday the next. The train begins in Brookville, typically
with 10 to 12 cars, though the Baldwin will pull up to 20. The line is all
downhill from Brookville, with grades up to 2j and 3 percent. The line has
a caboose but rarely uses it.
The road has five full time employees—the three corporate officers and
two hourly paid crew members, who do track and equipment maintenance as well.
There are two half-time office employees, working alternative weeks, one on
corporate accounts, one on interline accounting,
crack employees. Operations are nonunion.
There are three part-time
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The total traffic volume will "be about 1,000 cars in 1982, or
originated/terminating about 39 cars, per mile, and perhaps 50,000 ton miles
per mile. These figures are of course low by comparison with some other roads
in the sample. Figures for earlier years were 1973, 1077; 1977, 829; 1980,
^27; 1981, 1,153-
The principal shipper is the Owens-Corning Fiberglass plant, the bulk
of its traffic consisting of inbound movement of ingredients for the
production of roofing: roofing granules, sand, fibre glass mats, sawdust,
scrap paper, talc, boiler ash, etc. Some come in covered hoppers, some
in boxcars. The firm ships a portion of its outbound product by rail,
including shingles, particularly to Detroit, and also felt. Smaller lots to
dealers go by truck. A major shipper in the past has been Crest Component
Homes, a producer of prefabricated homes, bringing in an average of 2 cars
a day of lumber. Currently, however, the market is so depressed that the
firm is making little use of the rail line. Cincinnati, Inc., a producer of
heavy machinery, located near Valley Jet., brings in steel by rail.
Other shippers include the Franklin Casket Company in Brookville, which
brings in lumber but ships its products out by truck; some feed and fertilizer,
and some block robber. The largest part of the traffic terminates or originates
in Brookville, but a portion is handled at Cedar Grove, plus that in the
8 miles between Valley Jet. and Harrison, on the Ohio border. A high percen-
tage of total traffic is inbound.
Rates . The line has joint rates with Conrail, its only connection,
through Valley Jet., on the outskirts of Cincinnati, with interline settle-
ment. Conrail has changed one rate, on waste paper, from joint to combination
resulting in a higher figure, but has not altered others. The line finds
Conrail officials in the area cooperative, but encounters some problems with
higher authority.
Earnings and Subsidy . The line received substantial subsidy, for
rehabilitation and operation, from the state of Indiana. The 1981 projection
for example, showed revenue of $113,178, operating costs $^35,000, lease,
$178,000, taxes $21,000, and thus total subsidy of $522,000, of which
$365,000 were Federal funds. In the year ending June 30, 1982, the state
provided only half of the lease and tax cost, and as of the 1982-83 year,
nothing. These figures are seriously destorted by the rehabilitation expenses
and the extortionate lease figure, which is completely out of reason and
reflects deliberate extortion by the Penn Central of the state—Federal funds
then available. The road has also been aided by Owens-Corning, which is much
interested in preserving the line and has considered buying it.
The ability of the line to survive on its own depends upon satisfactory
settlement through court action of the purchase of the line, and traffic
improvement. The actual operating costs are of course very low. Strong
support by Owens-Corning is a major positive factor.
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M.P. 17.8
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M.P. 26.1
Madison Railroad Source: Indiana State Rail Plan , 1981,
Background . The Pennsylvania Railroad lost interest in the line as
early as 1969. indicating in that year that it was considering abandoning
it, partly "because of the cost of operating on the grade. The portion
"between Columbus and North Vernon was abandoned when a bridge washed out,
and the Penn Central reached the Madison portion via the B & 0. The situation
dragged on over several years; the track was allowed to deteriorate, until
ultimately, for example, there were reported to be 21 derailments in one month.
As a consequence, the business groups served by the railway became active in
trying to save the service. The line was not included in Conrail, but was
operated by the latter for a short period. It received #1 priority for
1. Primary sources were the manager of the railroad, the chairman oi
the Port Authority Board, and Indiana state rail plans.
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state aid in the first Indiana State Rail Plan, and in 1976, operation was
taken over, under subsidy, by a private firm, Madison Railway, as designated
operator. The firm was owned by persons from Illinois. Substantial Federal
funds under the 3R and ^R Acts were obtained for line rehabilitation.
In July of 1973, however, the private company indicated it would cease
operations Sept. 15, because of an impasse over the contract with the state.
A committee of rail shippers and receivers, appointed by the city council,
now pushed hard for municipal operation to preserve the line. The local
legislator succeeded in getting the Indiana Port Authority law changed to
allow a Port Authority to operate a railroad line not in excess of 50 miles
in length. Meanwhile, the mayor of Madison created the Madison Port Authority,
as the law permitted him to do. Within 30 days, the railroad was organized
and approval obtained from the Public Service Commission and the I.G.G., and
on September 16, the Port Authority took over operation as the designated
operator.
Ownership of the Line . The line is still owned, at present, by the Perm
Central (PC) . As with other such lines, the PC has pushed the lease to an
exhorbitant figure , 52^-3 1 000, exceeding the total gross revenue. The Port
Authority has been negotiating with PC to acquire the line. In the usual
pattern, the PC asked a completely unreasonable amount—$2,265,000, for a
line appraised for salvage value of $250,000. PC is now down to $750,000.
The Port Authority regards purchase as imperative and will resort to con-
demnation if an agreement cannot be reached. The plan is to obtain a portion
of the funds from the State Rail Loan Fund, established by the legislature,
some $250,000 from a special grant available to the Port, and the rest locally.
The state funds will be available at low interest rates. The Port Authority
could issue bonds, but this approach is being avoided thus far.
Ownership of the line is considered essential to avoid the rental
payments and to assure shippers of the permanence of operations.
Track . There are about 30 miles of track in total, including sidings.
Through over a million dollars of Federal-state funds over the past 6 years,
the track has been brought into acceptable shape; it meets Class I standards
and some segments Class II. Speed is limited to 10 miles an hour. The line
has no trouble with derailments. One problem is the numerous curves on the
northern portion of the line, and the track on these is watched carefully.
Substantial numbers of ties have been installed, plus ballast and ditching.
The rail is predominant ely 70 and 85 pounds, with some 100 and a little 115
•
It is old and worn but is usable. The line has two track men, but would
like to have 5 or 6. Weight limit is 130 tons, and some heavier loads are
handled.
Engines . Because of the steep grade, historically the line used
specially built steam locomotives, and in later years, diesels with special
features. In 1980 the road acquired its present diss el, an 1850 hp GP 10,
purchased from the Precision firm in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, with a HUD
development grant. The engine was previously used on the Toledo Peoria and
Western and was rebuilt in 1971 by the ICG shops in Paducah. It is a standard
locomotive, with no special features for the grade. It is capable of pulling
229 tons, gross, up the grade. The road does its own routine maintenance,
but receives help from Rexnord and other shippers for major repairs, usually
without cost. The engine is kept in the Rexnord plant in the winter to
avoid having to keep the diesel running continuously.
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Operations . The train does not operate on a regularly scheduled basis,
operations "being adjusted according to the needs of the shippers. It typically
runs twice a week, "but may run from 1 to 4 times. The engine may he overnight
at. p>i thpr pnri. ripmpnrH v.<r CiX\ t.hp npprts nf rniprat.inns.".er e d, depe ding on he eed o oper io s,
There are special safety requirements for operations down the grade,
particularly with regard to braking power, which in some instances requires
adding empties to the train to provide adequate total "braking. Needless to
say, extreme care is taken by the crew on the grade. The grade is perfectly
straight— it resembles the grade on an amusement park line roller coaster.
The operations on the grade are complicated by the need on occasion for
moving unusually heavy and wide equipment for the Indiana and Kentucky power
plant
.
Cars. The line does not own or lease any freight cars (except for
maintenance cars owned). The cars are supplied by the Chessie; currently
there is no shortage, though the road encountered some problems two years
ago. The line resisted temptation offered by the car leasing firms.
Employees . The line operates with 5 full time employees—the manager,
two crew members, and 2 trackmen, plus a part time (3 days a week) agent-
secretary-billing clerk. The manager chooses the employees, usually from
persons sent from the employment service. Technically they are city employees,
but do not have civil service status. They can be fired for cause. For a
time the line also used some GETA help. Operations are nonunion. There are
no employees who had worked for the Penn Central, but two carried over from
the private company, including the manager, whose earlier background was in
manufacturing
.
Traffic . The line has a substantial variety of traffic, both inbound
and outbound. Substantial quantities of coal, often handled with multiple
cars, are brought in for the state mental hospital. Steel comes in for
Rexnord, which also ships out various types of heavy construction equipment^
conveyors, etc.. Chemicals move in and out. While the power plant—a major
one—receives all its coal by barge, it brings in and ships out various
types of equipment. Some fertilizer and lumber come in by rail, and occasionally
farm machinery. There is limited amount of traffic in silica and borax
transferred from barges. The Madison traffic is divided about equally between
that going down the grade and that of plants on top of the grade.
For the industrial park in North Vernon located on the remnant of the
track that once went to Columbus, the line handles General Motors parts,
paper, some furniture, bus chassis, and other items.
The number of cars handled was 1180 in 1973, fell to 552 in 1978, but
was only about 400 cars in 1981, no more than 200 in 1980 (for reasons
explained below) and about 400 expected in 1982. This is only 17 cars
originated/terminated per mile. The road regards 1500 cars as necessary for
break even operation, or 63 cars per mile. The decline was partly the result
of the closing of a major wholesale grocery firm, and more recently, the
recession, which has hit the manufacturing firms severely. As noted below,
the potential for additional traffic is substantial.
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A limited amount of traffic is handled to or from intermediate points
—
Vernon (which adjoins North Vernon), Dupont, and the Jefferson Proving Grounds.
The line does not provide piggy "back service; this will "be considered,
"but would require more frequent operation than at present. Presently, piggy-
hack traffic to or from Madison is hauled to Cincinnati or other main line
points.
Rates . The traffic, both from Madison and from the North Vernon
industrial park, moves on joint rates with Ghessie, the line getting "between
15 and 20 percent, depending on the destination. The Madison does the
hilling hut rates and routing are provided by Chessie. Recently, on some
new movements, Ghessie has been requiring combination rates, asking the
Madison for its figure. This of course may lead to higher overall rates.
A more serious problem has been that in some instances, Chessie has simply
not been interested in establishing a commodity rate where the movement will
be small
—
providing only class rates, which are usually higher than truck
rates. The effect of truck deregulation has been to bring truck rates down.
On the whole, however, the road has found Ghessie to be highly
cooperative; relations are very good.
Relationships with the City . The railroad is essentially a unit of the
city government; technically it is operated by the Port Authority, itself a
unit of the city of Madison. The railroad manager reports to the Board of
Directors of the Port Authority, 9 persons, appointed by the mayor, consisting
of the mayor's administrative assistant', two members of the city council, and
persons from the major firms shipping on the line. The primary contacts of
the manager are with the chairman of the Board, who is from Rexnord, the
largest shipper, and the secretary, a retired army colonel, who was the
manager of the line in the early period after the city took over operations.
The board receives no salary or expense money. The railroad and the Board
go to the City Council only on major issues of policy; the mayor and the
council do not become involved in day to day operations. The city economic
development agency works closely with the railroad and the port authority
as well
.
The Financial Problems and the Future . First the private Madison
Railway and then the city operated Madison Railroad received Federal and
state operating subsidy, as well as rehabilitation funds, in view of the
high priority attached by the state to the line. However, in 1981, the
Federal subsidy funds were suddenly cancelled as an element in the policies
of the Reagan administration. This left an $80,000 gap in revenues to cover
obligations in 1981, and in May of that year the port authority shut the
railroad down, and it did not operate for two months. Ultimately $170,000
was raised from the local business interests, and operations were resumed.
The state financed half of the rental and tax payments for the year.
At the present traffic levels, the line is not able to break even,
and only the strong support of the business community is enabling it to
continue. The Port Authority is asking the cities of Madison and North
Vernon and the two counties involved to add 3 cents to the property tax
levies to provide subsidy for the next several years until traffic improves.
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There is strong conviction on the part of the business community that
the railroad is essential for continuation of present activity and for
development of additional manufacturing and bulk commodity terminal operations,
There are problems, however, in getting some shippers to use the railroad as
much as possihle--in part because of the long -unhappy experience with the
Pennsylvania and the Perm Central.
The Port Authority and the management believe that once the city gains
ownership of the line, it will be able to operate successfully—assuming of
course recovery of the economy. There have been major plans for bulk
commodity terminals, some of which have been built, but the effect of the
recession has been to stop any further progress. These plans, if successful,
could provide as much as ij-800 cars a year in traffic. The master plan of the
area envisages strong effort to obtain more industry—for which the railroad
is essential, and which will ensure profitability of operations. The track
is now adequate; management is obviously effective; costs are very low. There
is great potential—and a strong desire of the business community to keep
the line.
Conclusions . The Madison is obviously not viable under private
operations with present traffic. It must be regarded essentially as an
instrument to aid economic development of the community, one that has great
potential. There is clearly strong justification for continuation of the
line, and for state and/or local subsidy when essential to keep it going in
the immediate future.
3^
Central Wisconsin Railroad—Whitewater Line
The Central Wisconsin Railroad "began operations in March 1980, on the
former Milwaukee (Milw) line extending from Waukesha, on the western outskirts
of the Milwaukee metropolitan area, southwestward ^1 miles, through Whitewater
to Milton Jet., in an agricultural area. It is a portion of the state's
first railroad, "built from Milwaukee via Madison to the Mississippi at Prairie
du Chien in the early lS50s, and on to St. Paul. The Wisconsin portion was
long known as the Milw's Prairie du Chien division. At Milton Jet. the direct
route from Chicago joined the line. Later the line "became a rather minor
Milwaukee "branch, as through traffic shifted to the La Crosse route. The
principal city served solely by the line is Whitewater, pop. 10,950. Other
towns exclusively served, with population, are N, Prairie, 753; Eagle, 865;
and Palmyra, 15^-2.
Background
. In 1976 the Milwaukee applied to the ICC to abandon the
Waukesha-Whitewater portion. This request was denied by the ICC. The
Milwaukee's second application to abandon the whole line was granted late
in 1978; the state bought the line for $266,677, or $6500 a mile. The 1978
Rail Plan recommended state action to ensure continuation of service to
Whitewater, preferably from the western end, but abandonment of the eastern
portion because of light traffic. The state conveyed the property to the
city of Whitewater, which provided 20% of the cost. The city contracted with
the Central Wisconsin Railroad Co. to operate the line as of March 4, 1980.
The city owns the track and structures, the state, the land.
Origin . The Central Wisconsin was developed by John Zerbel, a CPA,
with offices in Brookfield, adjoining Waukesha. Zerbal grew 'up in a rail-
road family (his father was an executive of the Lake Superior and Ishpeming,
in Marquette, Michigan) . He worked for the railroad for six years before
moving into the accounting field. In the early sixties he was involved in
a development project in northern Michigan, and acquired a small railroad as
an element in the project. This did not succeed because of various problems,
but he retained the railroad, on which excursion trains are
operated in the summer.
His interest in lines in southern Wisconsin began when he served as
a consultant to shippers concerned with the prospective abandonment of the
Whitewater line in 1976. He and others offered to buy the line; the Milw
refused. Ultimately abandonment and state purchase followed. Zerbel then
formed the Central Wisconsin Railroad, which became the operator for the
Whitewater line, under a 25 year contract with the City of Whitewater, with
an option to buy the line. Zerbel was able to raise the capital from
private sources, local area investors, in large part because of the signifi-
cant tax advantates arising out of rapid writeoff of the rehabilitation costs
for income tax purposes. The company has Chapter S status and thus can pass
losses through to the stockholders. The line has received no subsidy either
for rehabilitation or operation. Zerbel recognized the light traffic potential
but was convinced the line could break even—arid primarily he wanted it for
access from Milwaukee to the lines in the Madison area, which he hoped
ultimately to obtain.
1. The primary sources were Mr. John Zerbel, president of the line,
and Wisconsin state rail plan volumes.
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Track . The line has no grade over 1%. The track is laid primarily with
75 pound rail, most of it rolled around the turn of the century hut is in
relatively good condition; rails of that period, made with some nickel content,
are more resilient and less likely to go down at the joints than newer rail.
Many of the ties were deteriorated, and ballast was inadequate. The new
company installed some 4000 ties the first summer and 3000 the second (treated
oak ties) ensuring safe operation. By October 1982 the line, which already
looks remarkably good, will be up to Class III standards, allowing k0 mph opera-
tion. Zerbel 'has brought the line up to this standard for less than $300,000,
compared to the state's original estimate of $671,000 to bring it to Class I
standards. His philosophy is to avoid expensive equipment. The line has
not had a derailment from track problems in the two years of operations. The
only one was caused by snowmobiles packing the snow down to ice.
Equipment. The line was operated for most of the first two years by one
diesel, a 660 hp General Electric (originally Cooper Bessemer) built in
19h6, brought down from Northern Michigan. The company, as noted below, has
recently acquired several FM 1200 hp engines from the Milw, and one of these
is being used on the line. The policy is to avoid leasing freight cars; the
line bought 15 new covered hopper cars from Thrall to facilitate outward
movement of grain.
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The firm "built a three-stall equipment maintenance shop a few miles west
of Waukesha, where all repair (except machine work) can he done, for this
line and the others noted "below.
Operation . The line is not operated on a schedule, hut on the hasis of
the needs of the shippers—typically two or three times a week. A caboose
is not normally used, although the line has one.
Employees . The "basic philosophy of the management is that a high degree
of flexibility in the work done "by employees is essential. All persons
hired are required to he proficient in two areas. Apart from management,
the line is operated with four persons—a two man crew, an equipment super-
visor (a highly skilled diesel engine electrician) and a track foreman.
All do other work as well . Additional workers are hired for track work during
the summer season. There is no unionization.
Relations with Other Roads . The line has physical interchange facilities
with the Milw at Milton Jet., and with the Milw, the Chicago and Northwestern
and the Soo at Waukesha, the latter reached "by trackage rights over a section
of the Milw.
The company has had substantial difficulty with the major lines over
joint rates and rate divisions. Zerhel has fought hard to ohtain what he
regards as adequate divisions, 25% or so. Initially the Milwaukee cancelled
all joint rates; hut these were ultimately restored. The Soo has joint
rates with the line. But the Chicago and Northwestern cancelled the joint
rates and no agreement has "been reached with them, so there is no interchange--
except in a few cases, in which the CW has insisted on prepayment, on a local
class rate hasis. Surcharges are imposed—which the company can do unilaterally-
hut the aim is to keep these as low as possihle.
Traffic . In 1979, the last year of Milw operation, a total of 309
carloads were handled, all but 22 inbound. In 1981, outhound traffic was
ahout 100, inbound 500, a total of 600, or 14 cars originated/terminated
per mile. The company helieves that with a little effort the outbound
traffic (primarily grain) can be raised to 500 to 600; this, plus the
500 inbound cars, will provide 1000 to 1200 cars a year. With average
earnings of about $325 per car, or $325,000 total, the line can break even.
Currently it is showing on paper a substantial loss—but this is a product
of rapid depreciation, advantageous for tax purposes. As noted, much of the
interest in the line centers around its access to the lines to the west, as
noted in the next section.
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The Madison, Wisconsin,, area lines, formerly operated bv Chicago Madison, and Northern
.
now Central Wisconsin, and the Wisconsin Western
Southwest Wisconsin, the area west and south of Madison, once had a
substantial network of rail lines, which were built oy or ultimately became
portions of the Milwaukee or the Chicago and Northwestern, plus one Illinois
Central line. But not only was there excessive duplication of lines, but the
area is primarily a dairy area and much of the earlier traffic was taken
over by trucks, and mining declined. The Chicago and Northwestern had sought
over a decade ago to abandon its line serving Lancaster and Platteville, agreed
to continue it for a time in exchange for legislative changes relating to
full crew laws, and finally abandoned it in the mid seventies.
The Milwaukee Lines . The more southerly Milwaukee line extended from
Janesville west through Monroe and Gratiot, then swinging north to Mineral
Point. The Janesville-Monroe segment, 33 miles, serving Hanover and Brodhead
as well as Monroe, is primarily a terminating road. The traffic, primarily
to Monroe, consists of paper products and nonmetallic ores, as well as
fertilizer; the limited outbound traffic, mostly logs. It originated/terminated
46 carloads per mile in 1979. The line was purchased by the state for $361,900
or $10,990 per mile, as of March 27, 1980. The portion from Monroe to Mineral
Point, 46 miles, serves Darlington and Mineral Point, as well
as smaller communities. It originated/terminated only 8 cars per mile in
1980, the primary traffic being inbound fertilizer. This portion was acquired
by the state for $214,091, as of Feb. 26, 1980 or $4,654 per mile.
In the 1981 state rail plan, the B/C ratio on the Janesville-Monroe
portion was found to be 10.29, on the Mineral Foint portion, 1.31. The two
lines ranked 10th and 13th in priority in the 1981 plan.
Following purchase, both lines were conveyed to the Pecatonica Transit
Commission, which paid 20% of the cost, and which contracted with the Chicago
Madison and Northern to operate the lines.
The state estimate for funds necessary for rehabilitation was $884,116 for the
first phase (1980-1982), a total of $4,177,l6l for the total project.
About 2/3 of the money would be Federal, the rest from the state, the railway,
and the transit commission.
The Madison-Freeport Line . The third element in the Madison area lines
extends 59 miles south from Madison to Freeport, Illinois, where it connects
with the Illinois Central Gulf's Iowa line. This was an Illinois Central
line. The ICG first sought to abandon the line in 1976; the request was
originally denied by the ICC, then finally approved, and then delayed by
appeals. This line originated/terminated in 1977, 17 cars per mile, almost
all of it to or from Madison, plus some food products to Monticello. Termina-
ting traffic was about 3 times originating traffic. In addition to Madison,
the line also served Monroe, but had relatively little traffic to or from that
point. It intersected Milwaukee track in Monroe. The 1981 rail plan showed
negative benefits for retention of the entire line, but .89 for the Monroe-
Monticello portion to be operated in conjunction with the ex-Milwaukee lines.
The line serves no useful purpose in Madison. The line was in relatively good
shape with 20 MPH speed, except for a 10 mile limit in one tunnel.
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This line was also purchased by the state, for $2.69 million, or
$^5,420 per mile, and Chicago Madison and Northern originally designated
to operate it. This company also operated the Sparta-Viroqua line.
Failure of the Chicago Madison and Northern . The CM&N failed in March
of 1982 and ceased operations. There were several reasons reported for the failure.
It was managed "by persons without railroad experience, or apparently, much
management expertise generally. Primarily the promoters were rail fans,
interested in trying to run a railroad. They accepted rate divisions with i
the Milwaukee that were hopelessly inadequate. There were serious problems
with methods of operation, particularly, in holding cars for substantial
periods in order to run larger trains. There was inadequate cost control.
In addition, some of the lines had very limited traffic, and the company
apparently overestimated the potential. In any event, the company went into
bankruptcy. In March of 1982, the Central Wisconsin became the designated
operator, including the Freeport line, but not the Sparta-Viroqua line;
the company had no interest in this line because local shippers were not
willing to provide funds or show much concern. The line, difficult to
operate, had deteriorated significantly. The Central Wisconsin, in addition
to taking over these lines, obtained trackage rights over the M ilw between
Milton Jet and Janesville and between Milton Jet and Madison, thus linking,
by two ways the Waukesha line and the newly acquired routes.
Employees and Equipment . With these lines added, the number of CW
employees was increased by 9, to operate 137 additional miles. Four FM
1200 hp diesels were acquired from the Milw, and 4 more are on order; 5 will
be able to operate in multiple. These will all be maintained at the shop
near Waukesha, and there will be substantial run-through operations. A
single agent in Monroe will do all the billing, handling of accounts,
demurrage, etc. The track on these lines has experienced some rehabilitation.
The line to Freeport is in relatively good shape, although additional ties
are needed plus some tunnel repair. Service is currently operated between
Monroe and Janesville, the heaviest traffic route, 5 times a week; and once or
twice a week to Mineral Point. This is a very light traffic line, but the
company hopes for increased shipments of fertilizer ingredients from the
mine tailings. There is hope for all of these lines for increased outflow
of grain, particularly if the port of Milwaukee ever develops as hoped.
Wisconsin Western . In July of 1982, the owners of Central Wisconsin
took over the Milw's line from Madison to Prairie du Chien, 118 miles, to
be operated as the Wisconsin Western Railroad. The eastern portion of this
line-^as far as Lone Rock and Richland Center—was operated by the Milw up
until the time of transfer. The portion west of Lone Rock to Prairie du
Chien had not been operated by the Milw since March 1980, but the rail
were intact. The WW is already operating the eastern portion, but will not ,
have track repairs completed to operate to Prairie du Chien until early Fall, 1982. '
The track on this line is in relatively good shape, with 85 and 90 pound
rail laid in the late twenties; with little work it can be brought to Class
III standards. The track on the two branches, however, is very light, some
of it 5o pound rail, which ultimately must be replaced.
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Traffic . These two lines have considerably heavier traffic potential
than most of the Central Wisconsin system.
In 1979, the cars originated/terminated per mile on the portion east from
Richland Center was Jl, on the western portion 27. There are a number of
products handled, principally inbound fertilizer, outbound cheese, casien,
and the like, and some logs and lumber and manufactured goods. The line
as a whole terminates much more than it originates, but the company has
hopes of substantial increases in lumber traffic.
Overall System Traffic . For the entire system, now about 315 miles,
with trackage rights of about 50 miles, the firm expects traffic of about
6500 cars originated/terminated the first year, or 21 cars per mile. About
$1 million will be raised from private sources for rehabilitation in
addition to $500,000 of Federal funds for the Mineral Point line, originally
arranged by the CM&N . The expectation is that after a few years the traffic
will be up to 10,000 to 12,000 cars, or 32 to 38 VeT mile—if the outbound
grain traffic can be increased. The firm has ^00 additional cars on order
from North American. The line expects to have 2k full time employees when
the system is complete, equivalent to one per 16 miles, in addition to
seasonal track workers.
There are also plans for piggyback operation, not now handled, primarily
with pick up of trailers at such points as Waukesha and Janesville, even
coming out of the Chicago area, and going west.
Conclusions: The Central Wisconsin System . This is an interesting
experiment—an attempt to bring together a network of abandoned lines, all
of which have light traffic and two of which have so little traffic that
most operators would not attempt them even under subsidy. Basically this
is being done with private capital. The lines have, of course, been greatly
aided by state purchase of the track. It is entirely possible that very
close cost control, efficient management, and aggressive seeking of traffic
will make the project succeed. Already the seemingly hopeless Whitewater
line has experienced a traffic gain and may very well break even, as well
as contributing to the system as a whole. Tax considerations have played
a major role in the development of this system.
40
SUMMARY
Table 1 summarizes some of the basic information on the sample roads.
It is possible to separate the various lines of Central Wisconsin for some
purposes, but they cannot be separated for others.
Ownership of Track
There are three patterns of ownership of the lines:
1. By the new company: The Indiana Hi-Rail and the South Central
Tennessee.
2. 3y the predecessor railroad—although the plan is in all instances
to acquire the line: Perm Central, Prairie Central, Indiana and
Ohio Milwaukee Seattle and North Coast, pending purchase by local
port authorities.
3. By a governmental unit: State: Gettysburg; Port Authority: Pend
Oreille, Madison, Ind. ; Local Transit Commission: Central Wisconsin.
Operating Entity
Similarly, the pattern of ownership of the railroad enterprise varies.
It Local enterprise:
Indiana Hi-Rail, formed by persons previously involved in state rail
planning
.
Indiana and Ohio, formed by local families, the principal person having
railroad experience.
Gettysburg, formed by a family with tourist excursion railroad experience.
Central Wisconsin, local interests, principal being a CPA ; railroad
experience.
Seattle and North Coast, formed by persons with some contact with
the railroad industry.
<
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2. Group Systems. Enterprises have developed in the last decade (some
earlier) that have taken over the operation of several small railroads,
either newly formed ones of the type covered by the study or existing roads.
Three of the sample lines fell into this pattern:
Pend Oreille Valley and South Central Tennessee, "both operated "by Kyle
Railways of San Diego California. This system "began when two decades
ago Willis Kyle took over the Pacific Great Eastern, primarily a tourist
road in Oregon; it has expanded rapidly in recent years, to operate,
under different types of arrangements, about a dozen lines. Kyle
had been involved in the family steel distribution business in Fresno,
California.
Prairie Central, owned by Trans-Action Associates, headed by Craig
Burroughs, of New Lenox, Illinois. This enterprise operates several
other lines as well, some for over a decade.
In both the Kyle and Burroughs systems, substantial autonomy is allowed the
local manager, but the central enterprise assists and is involved in major
decisions.
3. Local Government. Only the Madison Railroad is operated by a local
governmental unit; the other such units owning lines prefer to contract with
private firms for actual operation, as did Madison initially.
One additional pattern would have been noted if it had been possible to
include either the Kankakee, Beaverville and Southern or the Tippecanoe—both
owned cy the major shippers on the line, grain elevators.
One obvious trend is for existing short lines, whether newly formed or
not, to take on additional lines; Central Wisconsin, the Indiana Hi-Rail,
as noted above; the La Salle and Bureau County in Illinois, the Cadillac and
Lake City, for example, making use of their expertise.
^3
Track, Engines, Jars, Operation
Miles of Track . The miles of track range from 6 to about 300 if the
entire Central Wisconsin-Wisconsin Western network, exclusive of traffic
rights, is counted as a unit; otherwise, 75 is the longest. Four are between
*U and 6l
; 3 between 20 and 30. A short line has the advantage of the traffic
moving only a short distance at the relatively high cost of light traffic
lines, but suffers from lack of specialized personnel and perhaps efficient
use of equipment. A system combining a number of short lines over which the
traffic is moving short distances with centralized management and equipment
maintenance may be the optimal arrangement.
Engines . The number ranges from 1 to 5 ("to 8 if the Central Wisconsin
system is treated as a unit) . All but one of the roads with less than iJ-5 miles
has only one engine; between 50 and 75 miles, 2 to 4 is typical, with 6 on
the Seattle and North Coast with its unusual operating problems. While the
needs vary with the traffic volume, a reasonable generalization is that up
to ^5 miles a line can get by with only one engine. All are second hand, many
are 20 to 30 years old, originally built for Class I railroads. Horsepower
is typically in the 1000 to loOO range, from 660 for the Central Wisconsin
Whitewater engine to I85C on the Madison, with its steep grade. Virtually
all manufacturers are represented—EMU, GE, FM, IH, Baldwin. All roads maintain
their own diesels, with some outside assistance when necessary. Highly important
is a place to keep them in the winter when they are not operating, or the
diesel has to be kept running. With only one exception the lines own their
engines
.
Freight Cars . The policies vary widely, from roads that use entirely
cars from their connecting carriers to those that have acquired a few cars
to facilitate some type of outbound business, and to one, the Seattle and North
Coast, which has entered into an agreement with car leasing firms for sub-
stantial numbers of cars. For a time this was advantageous for short lines;
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now that there is a surplus of cars, these agreements can "become a serious
nuisance, as the cars yield revenue only when they are in use. None of
these lines, however, are primarily car leasing operations, as are some short
lines.
Track Conditions
. Most of the lines merely meet Glass I track standards
k 10 mph) , and do not seek to move to higher classes, as the time savings is
not worth the additional cost. The Prairie Central, however with 75 miles
of operation, meets Class II (25 mph) and the Central Wisconsin Whitewater
line will reach Class III by October 1982. Most have had access to Federal
funds for rehabilitation, and1 the Indiana Hi-Rail is now seeking Federal funds,
although Central Wisconsin has financed most rehabilitation work privately. Rail
is typically 75 pound—adequate but barely so for the maximum weight cars.
Some is 90 pound, and the Gettysburg has 130 pound rail (this was once a
main line freight route)
. The lowest is 56 pound, on the Richland Center
branch of Wisconsin Western. Much of the rail is old, some dating back
to the turn of the century, but the age is not important so long as the
rail is not worn and the ties and ballast are adequate. The midwest and
eastern roads typically use treated oak ties, the western, treated fir.
Operation . About half of the lines operate on a regular five times a
week schedule (6 on the Prairie Central); of the rest, two to three times a
week on three lines and portions of Central Wisconsin. The least frequent
is once to twice a week on the Mineral Point line of Central Wisconsin.
Several, such as the Madison, do not run on a scheduled basis but according
to the needs of the shippers. The typical train would have 5 to 10 cars,
except the Prairie Central, with a usual figure of 30.
^5
Em-ployees
The number of employees is dependent upon the length of line and the
volume of traffic. The roads fall into three groups:
1. The very light traffic lines, 5 to 6 employees, including managerial-
-
a manager, a train crew of two, a track supervisor and an agent-auditor-hilling
clerk. In addition seasonal help is hired for track maintenance. This type
of operation involves maximum flexibility in the use of labor—for example,
the train crew will do both equipment and track maintenance work when not
running the train; the manager will aid in the switching.
2. The somewhat heavier traffic and/or longer lines: 9 to 15 employees
—
with, for example, a train crew of 2, 1 for equipment maintenance, k for
track work, an auditor, an agent, and a manager. Only 3 exceed these figures:
2k for the entire Central Wisconsin system, a very low figure per mile;
24- for Prairie Central, with its heavy traffic, relatively long line and need
for two crews, and 53 for Seattle and North Coast, with its separate switching
operations and maritime problems.
Train crews consist of two persons on all except for three on the
Indiana Hi-Rail, with its extensive switching, and Seattle and North Coast,
with difficult operating problems. Most of the lines do not use a caboose.
Only the Indiana Hi-Rail employees are unionized—with a very liberal
contract with the United Transportation Union, with the privilege of using
a crew of 2, flexibility in the use of labor, and no work rules, and pay of
80^ of the standard union contract. For the typical small road, the number
of employees is so small and the need for a high degree of flexibility in the
use of labor and payment of local wage scales so imperative for operation
that the lines could not operate with the standard Class I union contracts,
and are net particularly suited for unionization of any kind.
1. The operator of one line in Iowa maintains that he can run a line
with only two persons.
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Traffic
The types of products handled vary widely. Some lines concentrate
heavily in a few products, as explained in previous sections; others have a
wider range of agricultural and industrial goods. While all have some
inbound and outbound traffic, five of the lines are primarily originating
carriers; two ( Indiana-Ohio and Central Wisconsin) are primarily terminating,
and Madison and Gettysburg have some of each. Only Gettysburg has a substantial
volume of bridge traffic; it is an important overhead carrier between Gonrail
and Ghessie. Most do not handle piggyback traffic but several are interested
in developing it.
The volume of traffic likewise varies widely. Exact figures of net ton
miles per mile of track, the best measure, are not available, though they
can be approximated for some lines. Therefore cars originated or terminated
per mile of line are used as the best available information. The figures for
the Wisconsin Central lines are based on previous experience, as the new
system has not been functioning long enough to have satisfactory data.
Indiana Hi-Rail 333
Gettysburg, including overhead traffic 276
(originating-terminating 76)
Prairie Central 90
Seattle and North Coast 71
Pend Oreille 59
Central Wisconsin: J anesvilie-Monroe 46
Indiana and Ohio 39
South Central Tennessee 36
Wisconsin Western 29
Madison (Indiana) 17
Central Wisconsin:
Madison-Freeport 17
Whitewater line 14
Monroe-Mineral Point 7
Thus the range is phenomenally high, from 7 to 333 •
k?
Relations with Major Carriers and Joint Rates
Short lines are highly dependent upon their connecting railroads; it is
cf tremendous advantage far a line to "be able to connect with more than one
carrier. The sample lines are about equally divided on -.his; the Central
Wisconsin lines, Seattle and North Coast, Gettysburg, Prairie Central (though
heavily dependent on Conrail) , and Indiana Hi-Rail indirectly have more than
one connecting line. The major carriers also differ in their attitudes
toward connecting roads: Chessie, in general, has a good reputation for this,
Conrail has improved materially, others fare less well. The major carriers
have become less interested in establishing joint rates, and more strict on
their rate divisions. But on the whole the sample lines do not fare too
badly. Indiana Hi-Rail does not have joint rates but is treated as a
switching carrier, getting a fixed sum per car it handles.
The Profitability of the Lines
It is impossible to be certain of the potential profitability of the
lines at present. Some have been operating for only a short period; some
are not willing to reveal profits or losses (they do not report to the ICC)
;
some have grossly inflated (legally) loss figures for income tax reasons at
present (via accelerated depreciation, for example). The profitability
depends upon several factors: traffic density (since costs cannot be reduced
below certain minimum figures); rates (these do not vary nearly as much by com-
modity as in the past), the all-important rate division with major carriers, the
ability to keep costs under control, and the condition of the track.
The importance of traffic density is apparent when the sample firms are
considered. Of the five with high density, there is every indication that four will
succeed: Gettysburg, Indiana Hi-Rail, Prairie Central and Pend Oreille.
The other, Seattle and North Coast, should also so long as it can solve its
pier problems. The South Central Tennessee, with somewhat less traffic,
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appears to be succeeding. The Indiana and Ohio is suffering from a major
problem relating to the lease of track and purchase; it should make it if
it can acquire the line at some tolerable figure. The Central Wisconsin
Whitewater line is one of the lightest traffic routes, but management believes
that it can break even with some increase in grain traffic and the line is
important as an element in the expanded system. The Janesville-Monroe line
and the line to Prairie du Chi en should be self-supporting. The Mineral
Point line is not viable without considerable traffic increase.
The Madison, (ind.) , line is not viable with present traffic and probably could
not survive as a private enterprise. But it is regarded as an important
element in the economic development of Madison, and its continuation is
clearly justifiable on this basis.
It must be stressed that almost all of these lines
—
particularly ones
such as Indiana and Ohio, Indiana Hi Rail, and Madison—are suffering from
traffic declines due to the recession; improved conditions should materially
aid the railroads. It is also important to note that despite the bad business
conditions, most of the lines are carrying more traffic than they carried
under the previous major system operation.
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CONCLUSIONS
Out of the experience of the sample roads, some conclusions car. be
drawn—but they must be regarded as tentative, given the limited experience
to date of most of these lines.
1. There are clearly lines that have been or are about to be abandoned
by major rail systems that can be operated profitably by small enterprises.
Their costs are lower, and they can adapt services much more effectively to
the needs of shippers—as evidenced by the growth in traffic on these lines
in a period of economic decline.
2. The ability of such a local line to succeed is greatly influenced
by the volume of traffic. It is impossible to establish a precise minimum
figure because of the effect of other factors, but except under unusual
circumstances, a line with traffic over 60 cars is almost certain. to succeed,
and over 40 to have a good chance of survival', between 20 and 40, marginal
—
but a chance, and below 20, success only under unusual circumstances.
3. In general, the shorter the distance the traffic must flow on the
light traffic line, the greater is the chance of success, but combining a
number of small lines under common overall management offers advantages in
specialization in management and maintenance functions and bargaining power
with large railroads.
4. Another major influence on survival is the share of the total
rate. Since the short line does the switching and, with originating carriers,
the billing (except with junction settlements), it is obviously entitled to
a share greater than the percentage its mileage constitutes of the total haul,
plus some additional based upon its higher costs. The ability to get a
reasonable share relative to costs is largely a matter of bargaining with the
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major system, bargaining in which large shippers often can "be more effective
than the railroad itself. Having connections with more than one railroad is
of great importance in getting fair treatment.
A major problem has been arising with the tendency of some of the large
roads to cancel joint rates with small lines, resulting in combination rates
that are almost certain to be higher and cause possible loss in traffic to (
tracks
.
5. Effective management is of key importance for success—the ability
to hold costs down to an absolute minimum with the lowest traffic lines,
and at the same time to provide service that is suitable to the shippers.
Management is most effective if the manager has railroad experience, preferably
coupled with general management experience. One is impressed with the hard
work and enthusiasm of the officials of these roads, but management skill is
also highly important. The experience of "rail fans" without management
background trying to operate railroads has not been good.
6. Given the need for maximum flexibility in the use of labor and for
paying no more than local wages for comparable work, these railroads cannot
survive with under standard railroad union contracts based on major line
conditions. Survival is possible only on a nonunion basis, or with a union
contract that meets the two requirements noted in above.
7. Purchase of the right of way and track by states or local governments
as in Wisconsin and Washington has been of great aid in assisting newly formed
lines to get under way. Wisconsin, which will pay only net salvage value, has been
very successful in getting the lines cheaply, for what their commercial value J
--usually not over $20,000 a mile.
8. Lines whose track is owned by Perm Central have had a very difficult
time. One of the greatest mistakes made in transport legislation in recent
decades was that of allowing lines not included in Conrail to remain with the
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Penn Central (and other previous rail owners) . The Penn Central has used
techniques reminiscent of the monopoly railroads of the last century at their
worst: demanding rental payments that are irrational—often exceeding total
gross revenue to force the companies to buy the lines, at equally extortionate
prices, four times or more their commercial value. The new lines of course
cannot pay these figures; the result is to delay settlement of the title
and cause expensive condemnation suits. Wisconsin won a major court case
against the Chicago and Northwestern on the Lake Geneva line—a decision
»
which should serve as a precedent that legally the lines are worth only net salvage
value (net after costs of removal)
.
9. Strong support by major shippers is of great importance for survival.
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Appendix
Other Lines in Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin
The lines in the sample have all succeeded—to date at least. To
provide a broader view, Table A-ihas been prepared to list all railroads formed
to take over lines abandoned by major systems, so far as is known, in the
three states of Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.
In Indiana, there have been two failures. The Indiana Interstate
attempted to operate the line between Goshen and Shipshewanna, with a marginal
volume of traffic. Inability to control costs, the low traffic, and reported by some
personal problems resulted in failure. Two successive companies, Erie
Western and then Chicago and Indiana, attempted to operate the former Erie
Lackawanna main line across the state to the Ohio border, plus the Decatur-
Portland line. The basic problem was that the line was very long—187 miles
on the two portions—and while traffic volume was not hopeless, the consequence
was that the traffic had to move long distances at relatively high cost per
ton mile, this violated the basic principle that light traffic lines, per
se, can survive only if the traffic moves a short distance on the light
traffic line and a long distance on a low cost main line.
In Illinois, none of the lines have actually ceased, but the original
operator of the Decatur-Paris line gave it up, as discussed.
In Wisconsin, apart from the Chicago Madison and Northern, referred
to previously, the other failure was the Chippewa River, which had considerable
traffic, but major repairs required to two bridges made continued operation
uneconomic. J
Thus the overall record of continued operation in these three states
has, to date, been relatively good in the sense of the lines being kept in
operation even if the initial operator fails.
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The average figure of cars originated/terminated per mile of the lines
that are clearly succeeding in these states is 124 (73 if the highest traffic
line is omitted), of those failing, 32, of those somewhat marginal, 42.
But some lines under 32 appear to he succeeding.
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